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This paper examines the effect of religion on positional concerns using survey experiments. 
We focus on two of the dimensions of religion – degree of religiosity and religious festivals. 
By conducting the experiments during both the most important day of Ramadan (the Night of 
Power) and a day outside Ramadan, we find that Ramadan overall has a small and negative 
impact on positional concerns. Detailed analyses based on the sorting of individuals’ degree 
of religiosity reveal that the decrease in the degree of positional concerns during Ramadan is 
mainly explained by a decrease in positionality among individuals with a low degree of 
religiosity. We also discuss the broader welfare implications of our findings. 
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“Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s house; neither shalt thou desire 
his wife, nor his servant, nor his handmaid, nor his ox… nor any thing 
that is his” 
The book of Exodus (20:17) 
 “…don't be envious of what I have given to people from my grace and 
don't enchant your eyes with the blessings and don't put your soul in 
search of them, because the envious person is unhappy at my blessings 
that I have distributed among my servants” 





People gain utility not only from their absolute level of income and consumption, but also 
from their levels of income and consumption relative to those of other people, i.e., 
positionality (or “status”). Positional concerns have been discussed by many scholars 
including Veblen (1899/2005) and Duesenberry (1949), but notably also by scholars with 
different political opinions such as Karl Marx, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill. 
However, as shown by the quote from the Book of Exodus and words from Muhammad, 
the discussion and awareness of this issue go back thousands of years.  
 
The issue of positionality and its impact on people’s behavior has been discussed for a 
long time among social psychologists (e.g., Festinger, 1954; Suls and Wheeler, 2000). It 
is argued that the negative impacts of positional concerns on people’s welfare are 
reflected in various feelings.
2 As discussed in the quotes above, the emotion related to 
positionality is envy. In our context, it is the feeling that may occur among people when 
they perceive that others who are comparable to themselves have better living conditions, 
expressed for example in higher levels of income or consumption. Envy is one of the 
seven deadly sins in Christianity. In the Quran, the holy book of Islam, envy (al-ghubta 
                                                 
1 In this paper, we focus on Abrahamic religions, i.e., Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, when giving 
examples to keep the paper compact since it is not a paper on religion per se. However, a future extension 
of this type of research to other religions is of course important to increase our understanding of 
positionality.    
2 See, e.g., Elster (1998) for a general discussion on the relationships between economics and emotions, 
including envy. See also Fischer and Torgler (2006) and Senik (2005).    3
in Arabic) is in many places presented as one of the most negative human emotions, one 
that needs to be evaded in order to be a good Muslim. It can therefore be argued that the 
followers of these major religious teachings may be intrinsically affected and develop 
different preferences toward positionality or status especially regarding their income or 
consumption relative to that of others.  
 
Many people around the world are religious, and when also considering people who are 
affected by religious festivals, almost everybody in the world is to some extent influenced 
by religion (for an overview of economics of religion, see, e.g., Iannaccone, 1998; 
Kumar, 2008).
3 A large body of literature suggests that people’s behavior and emotions 
might be affected by religion through changes in the socio-economic environment 
(Emmons and Paloutzian, 2003), for example manifested in more Christians attending 
church during Christmas and Easter and in the consumption patterns during Christmas, 
Easter, and Ramadan (Odabasi and Argan, 2009). 
 
The objective of the present paper is to analyze the effect of the degree of religiosity and 
religious festivals on positional concerns by using a survey experiment approach. 
Specifically, we conduct our experiment in Turkey, which is a secular but predominantly 
Muslim country, and we investigate the effect of the degree of religiosity and of the 
religious festival Ramadan on positionality. We examine positional concerns by using a 
survey experiment and three different types of goods: (i) income, (ii) working hours, and 
(iii) car consumption. Income is chosen to create our benchmark results, which can be 
used in comparisons with previous studies using similar approaches but different 
locations. In addition, we test for positional concerns toward number of working hours 
and the value of a car. These two goods are included since it is suggested in the literature 
that working hours (leisure) is non-positional, while the value of a car is expected to be 
highly positional. (Alpizar et al., 2005; Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Carlsson et al., 
2007; Carlsson et al., 2009; Frank, 1999; Ireland, 2001; Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000; 
Solnick and Hemenway, 2005;).
  
                                                 
3 For example, Iannaccone (1998) reports that American church membership and church attendance have 
risen in the last century, and that almost 95% of Americans believed in God at the time of his study.   4
 
During the last two decades, positional concerns have been empirically investigated by 
using either subjective well-being data (e.g., Akay and Martinsson, 2011; Clark and 
Oswald, 1996; Clark et al., 2008; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Luttmer, 2005; McBride, 
2001; Senik, 2004, 2009) or survey experiments (e.g., Alpizar et al., 2005; Carlsson et al., 
2007; Frank and Sunstein, 2001; Lampi and Nordblom, 2010; Pingle and Mitchell, 2002; 
Solnick and Hemenway, 1998). In the subjective well-being approach, positional 
concerns are analyzed in a regression framework (see, e.g., a discussion in van Praag and 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2008), where subjective well-being (measured as “happiness” or “life 
satisfaction”) is explained by an individual’s absolute level of income and her income 
relative to the average income of the people in her reference (comparison) group while 
controlling for other factors that might influence subjective well-being.
4 Then, the 
estimated coefficient of the relative income variable is a measure of the impact of 
positional concerns. On average it is found to be significantly negative, implying the 




The survey experiment is most commonly based on repeated hypothetical questions to 
elicit the degree of positional concerns of individuals, or more correctly the degree of 
positional concerns is elicited within a range rather than as an exact value (e.g., Carlsson, 
et al., 2007; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002; Solnick and Hemenway, 1998). The general 
design of survey experiments is that subjects make repeated pairwise choices between 
two alternatives. In each choice situation, the two alternatives are described to the 
                                                 
4 One important issue in the subjective well-being approach is that the actual reference group of an 
individual is unknown. In the analyses, an individual’s reference group is therefore assumed (e.g., Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2005). Clark and Senik (2010) use a novel approach by directly asking people about their 
reference groups, which are then used in their analyses. However, this is not an issue in survey experiments 
since the reference group is clearly stated in the experiment design. 
5 Some studies using subjective well-being data have identified a positive effect of relative income on 
people’s subjective well-being (Bookwalter and Dalenberg, 2009; Kingdon and Knight, 2007; Senik, 
2005). The positive effects of positional concern are interpreted as a type of tunnel-effect or altruism 
(Hirschman and Rothschild, 1973). The information about the income level of other people may be 
interpreted to signal future prosperity. This signal effect is found especially in transition economies where 
income mobility is higher (Ravillon and Lokshin, 2000). The other possible interpretation is altruism, 
although this effect is considered to prevail for poor, small societies with tight social connections (Kingdon 
and Knight, 2007).     5
subjects in terms of their own level of income or consumption and the average level of 
income or consumption among others in a specific group. Since each subject makes 
repeated choices, it is possible to calculate the degree of positional concern within an 
interval, where the length of the interval depends on the number of questions asked.  
 
A number of survey experiments suggest that people do have positional concerns, but that 
the degree of positional concerns differs across locations and types of goods. Positional 
concerns among people result in welfare loss, and this has been discussed for example in 
relation to saving patterns, wage formation, and labor supply behavior of individuals 
(e.g., Agell and Lundborg, 2003; Duesenberry, 1949; Neumark and Postleweit, 1998). 
Moreover, an interesting application of these results is in the discussion on optimal 
taxation, and for example Aronson and Johansson-Stenman (2008) and Blomquist (1993) 
analyze theoretically how to incorporate appropriate adjustments into the optimal tax 
rules to reduce welfare losses from positional concerns.  
 
To test the effect of a religious festival and degree of religiosity on positional concerns, 
we conduct survey experiments in Turkey.
6 We select Ramadan as the religious festival 
and conduct the first experimental session in the early morning of the Night of Power 
(Leylat al- Qadr), which is the most important day during Ramadan for Muslims.
 
Ramadan lasts 29-30 days and the Night of Power is on the 27
th day of the month of 
Ramadan. It is mentioned in the Quran that spending this night praying is “better than one 
thousand months”
7 (Quran, 92: Qadr). As a result, the religious activities peak during the 
daytime and the nighttime of this day. 
 
There are important social and psychological aspects of Ramadan and fasting, and these 
have long been discussed by Islamic scholars. Generally, they indicate that the aim of 
fasting is to improve the person’s empathy for others, sharing, kindness, generosity, and 
forgiveness (see, e.g., Kahn, 1997). Fasting is a highly demanding prayer that includes 
strict avoidance of fluids and nourishment from dawn (sahur) to dusk (iftar), and this is 
                                                 
6 In the 2001 World Value Survey, 99% proclaimed themselves to be Muslims in Turkey. 
7 However, this does not mean that prayers during the rest of the year can be substituted since the five daily 
prayers (Salat) comprise one of the five basic acts that are mandatory for each Muslim.    6
obligatory for every Muslim who has reached puberty and is capable of making rational 
judgments (Quran, 2:183-84). Fasting is the major form of prayer in Ramadan, and we 
use the degree of fasting as a proxy for the degree of religiosity. To be able to compare 
the positional concerns during Ramadan to those outside Ramadan, we also conducted 
another identical experimental session two months after Ramadan on a day during a 
period of only daily prayers and no religious festivals. We conducted both experimental 
sessions in the early morning to avoid the potential effect of hunger on behavior during 
Ramadan. Thus, our specific design allows us to disentangle the effects of the religious 
festival and the degree of religiosity on individual’s positional concerns toward different 
goods.  
 
Our results show that the subjects exhibit levels of positional concerns both during and 
outside Ramadan that are similar to the levels observed in Western countries. Positional 
concerns during Ramadan are however lower than outside Ramadan, which is expected 
given the environment surrounding Ramadan with its emphasis on the negative impact of 
envy and importance of empathy and sharing. The low religious people show stronger 
positionality concerns outside Ramadan, while high religious people are pretty much 
unaffected, and this explains the overall change in concerns during and outside Ramadan. 
Thus, our findings point to the fact that religious festivals affect people with lower 
degrees of religiosity, or alternatively people with lower degrees of religiosity change 
their behavior according to what is expected during the religious festival. 
 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we introduce 
our tailor-made survey-experiment design and in Section 3 we present the results 
including a detailed analysis of positional concerns separated into degree of religiosity 
and religious festival. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
2. The survey experiment  
 
We conducted two experimental sessions, one during the morning of the Night of Power 
during Ramadan and the other outside Ramadan during a time with no religious festivals   7
except the regular daily prayers, and this was the only difference between the way the  
experimental sessions were conducted. In the experiment, we investigated positional 
concerns for three different types of goods: (i) income, (ii) working hours (or leisure), 
and (iii) the consumption value of a car. In our experimental design, we first assume the 
following utility function for individual i: 
 




s i i i y y y y y y U − + − = − γ γ , 
 
where  Ui indicates the utility of individual i,  i y   is the absolute level of income of 
individual i, and 
r
s y  is the income level of other people in the society s.
8 The parameter γ 
shows the proportion of a change in utility that comes from an increase in relative 
income.  
 
The design of our survey experiment follows Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) and 
Alpizar et al. (2005). In the survey, we described that the subjects were about to make 
choices for their imaginary future relative, who would be living two generations into the 
future. The main reason why we phrased the scenario in terms of a future relative was to 
disregard the subject’s own circumstances and environment when conducting the 
experiment (see a discussion on this issue in Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002). The 
subjects were asked to choose the society that they thought would be in the best interest 
of their grandchild. The respondents were also reminded not to choose what they 
considered to be best for society, but only what would be best for their grandchild. The 
survey consisted of three parts: (i) main instructions, (ii) an example, and (iii) the 
experiment. The main scenario and the nine different choice situations are presented in 
the Appendix. 
 
Figure 1 below presents an example question that was presented after the main 
instruction. The example focused on income, which was the first good in our survey, to 
                                                 
8 An alternative specification is to use a ratio utility function, i.e.,  ) / , (
r
s i i y y y U , yet this specification  
results in a similar degree of positionality, and hence the effect on the overall results is unaffected (e.g., 
Alpizar et al., 2005).   8
illustrate the choice situations to come. In each choice situation, there were two societies 
A and B, and the subject was asked to choose one of them. The societies in the choice 
situations were identical except that the levels of the goods (income, working hours, and 
value of a car) were changed for the imaginary relative in order to facilitate calculation of 
marginal degree of positionality. It was also stressed that the prices of the goods were the 
same as the actual levels in both societies at the time of the survey.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
If a respondent is indifferent between the two societies presented in a choice situation, 




A A i y y y y γ γ − = − , , . By using this, we can then calculate the degree 



















Thus, if a respondent is indifferent between the two societies presented in Figure 1, then 
the marginal degree of positional concern, γ , is equal to 0.20. If the respondent chose 
society A (in which the relative income position of the imaginary future relative is better 
than in society B), then  20 . 0 < γ , and vice versa. Each respondent was asked to make 
repeated choices between the two societies, which allows us to calculate the degree of 
positional concern within an upper and lower bound.  
 
The complete experimental design is summarized in Table 1. The first block describes the 
design used to investigate positional concerns for income, and the table is read as follows. 
The first choice situation consists of a choice between society A (absolute income is 
2,000 Turkish lira, TRY,
9 and others’ average income is 2,200 TRY) and society B(1) 
(absolute income is 1,750 TRY and others’ income is 1,290 TRY). If a subject is 
                                                 
9 The exchange rate at the time of the experiments were 1.48 TRY = 1 USD and 1.42 TRY=1 USD, 
respectively. The price levels are chosen as realistic as possible by considering average wage rates in 
Turkey.   9
indifferent between these two societies, then the marginal degree of positionality is 0.28, 
as shown in the table. If society A is chosen, then the marginal degree of positionality is 
lower than 0.28, and vice versa. In the second choice situation, which is between society 
A and society B(2), the marginal degree of positionality is equal to 0.52 if the subject is 
indifferent between society A and B(2), etc. Thus, it is possible to set an upper and a 
lower bound on the marginal degree of positionality for an individual. The same survey 
design and interpretation for the choice situations relating to leisure and value of the car 
as for income are presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
We conducted the survey experiments at two different points in time, i.e., (i) on the most 
important day of Ramadan – the Night of Power – and (ii) on a day outside Ramadan, and 
subjects only participated in one of the two sessions, i.e., a between-subject design. The 
location of the experiment was a huge lecture hall with a capacity of 250 people to ensure 
enough space and privacy between the subjects. Both experiments were conducted in the 
same place and with the same assistants to avoid any confounding effects. In a post-
experimental questionnaire, we collected information about socio-demographic and 
economic information. It is not easy to identify an individual’s degree of religiosity, and 
since no objective measure to elicit this information exists, we need a proxy. We chose 
the degree of fasting as proxy, believing that this is a better proxy than self-reported 
degree of religiosity or religious attendance in a mosque. First of all, fasting is a 
demanding form of praying since it requires strict avoidance of fluids and nourishment 
from dawn to dusk. Second, asking about days of fasting stands out less than asking 
questions directly related to degree of religiosity, especially in a country like Turkey 
where such questions are somewhat politically sensitive. The subjects were then 
classified into two groups of religiosity depending on their degree of fasting. Only 
subjects who spent the whole Ramadan fasting are classified as having a high degree of 
religiosity (30 days for males and 25 days for females since the latter are exempted from   10
fasting during menstruation). The remaining subjects, i.e., those who did not fast all days, 





In total, 180 subjects participated in our two experimental sessions. We will begin by 
investigating for each good separately whether the subjects responded to the choice 
situations in a consistent way. The design of the experiment is such that a subject is 
expected to choose alternative A in a choice situation when the implicit marginal degree 
of positionality in the choice situation is higher than her own marginal degree of 
positionality. In the experiment, each subsequent choice situation for a specific good 
assumes a higher degree of positionality, and thus a subject is considered to have 
answered inconsistently if she ever chose alternative B after having chosen alternative A 
in an earlier choice situation for the same good (this conflicts with the monotonicity 
assumption of the utility). Approximately 20 subjects in each experimental session for the 
three goods are classified as inconsistent, and thus we have, depending on the good, a 
total sample of 130-140 subjects.  
 
Table 2 presents both the proportion of the subjects who chose society B in each choice 
situation, i.e., the proportion of subjects with a degree of positionality that at least 
corresponds to indifference in the specific choice situation, and the calculated mean 
degree of positionality for each good. Table 2 separates the results by religious festival 
(Ramadan and non-Ramadan), degree of religiosity (low and high), and type of goods. 
For each good, there are three different questions. In Table 2, the rows for choice 
situation should be read as follows: In the upper left corner, the value 0.44 is stated. This 
means that in the first choice situation in the income experiment conducted during 
Ramadan, with an implicit marginal degree of positionality of 0.28, 44% of the subjects 
classified as low religious subjects chose society B (implying that 56% chose society A, 
in which the absolute income is higher). Thus, this result can be interpreted as 44% of the 
                                                 
10 We use the labels “low” and “high” to differentiate between different degrees of religiosity. It would be 
more accurate to label the “low” group as “low and medium,” but for simplicity we decided to write only 
“low.”    11
subjects having an implicit degree of positionality that is at least equal to 0.28. The 
proportions of the subjects who chose society B gradually decrease in the subsequent 
choice situations as the implicit marginal degree of positionality increases from 0.28 to 
0.52 and then to 0.73 resulting in 43% and 35% of the low religious subjects choosing 
society B in these choice situations during Ramadan. The interpretation is similar for the 
other choice situations presented in Table 2. Overall, a large number of subjects chose 
society B in the first choice situation for each good, reflecting some degree of positional 
concern. As expected, there seems to be a higher degree of positionality for a luxury car 
than for income and working hours, which is expected. In a preliminary comparison 
between religious festivals and degree of religiosity, the key finding seems to be that 
people with a low degree of religiosity are less likely to choose society B during 
Ramadan compared to outside Ramadan, i.e., they show a lower degree of positionality 
during Ramadan.  
 
Table 2 also shows the results of the test of the hypothesis of equal proportions of 
individuals who chose society B, separated by festival and religiosity. We report the p-
values of the test of equality of proportions based on Mann-Whitney U tests. In the four 
main combinations of tests (i.e., degree of religiosity and religious festivals), we report 
tests of (i) no religious festival effect among people with a low degree of religiosity, (ii) 
no religious festival effect among people with a high degree of religiosity, (iii) no 
religiosity effect among low and high religiosity people during Ramadan and (iv) no 
religiosity effect among low and high religiosity people outside Ramadan. We find 
significant differences at the 5% level in several of the choice situations between the 
proportions of low religious subjects who chose Society B during Ramadan and outside 
Ramadan, except for in the case of luxury car consumption.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
To make our results directly comparable to previous studies, we also estimate the mean 
marginal degree of positionality split by religious festival (Ramadan and non-Ramadan) 
and degree of religiosity (high and low degree of religiosity) by using a non-parametric   12
estimator that is robust in the sense that it does not rely on any parametric assumption. To 
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where  k t  is the implicit marginal degree of positionality for the choice situation k=1, 2, 3, 
4; and  k P  is the actual proportion of the subjects who selected society B in the  kth choice 
situation.
12 The estimated mean degree of positionality with the Spearman-Karber 
estimator is also presented in Table 2, together with the 95% confidence intervals. As 
expected from the descriptive statistics, we find a higher degree of positional concern for 
income and car consumption than for working hours. Moreover, there are differences 
across religious festivals, yet the impact of degree of religiosity is only slightly different. 
By and large, the estimated mean degrees are similar to those found in other studies. For 
example, Carlsson et al. (2007) estimated MMDP for income to be around 0.59-0.71, 
using a similar experiment with a random sample of the population in Sweden. Alpizar et 
al. (2005) estimated the same degree of positionality for income as 0.45, using a sample 
of Costa Rican university students. The relationships between our three goods in terms of 
degree of positionality are similar to those reported in Alpizar et al. (2005). 
 
Moreover, we estimate a parametric model and control for some socio-demographic and 
economic characteristics of subjects to check the sensitivity of previous findings. To this 
end, interval regression is used by considering that the dependent variable is an interval 
(lower and upper bounds) of different implicit marginal degrees of positionality. The 
bounds used in the regression are the same as those used in the non-parametric analyses 
                                                 
11 An alternative is the Kaplan-Meier-Turnbull estimator, which by construction results in a lower mean 
degree of positionality due to the conservative way of treating the proportion of subjects with a degree of 
positionality between the points included in the experiments.  
12 In order to calculate the 95% confidence intervals, we need to calculate the standard errors. The variance 
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is the number of the respondent in the kth choice situation. Note that the first and the last choice situations 
are assumed as having 0 and 1 implicit degree of positionality.   13
above (the marginal degree of positionality found in Table 1), and for the extreme values 
the bounds are set to 0 and 1. We control for festival time and degree of religiosity by 
using three interaction terms with non-Ramadan and low degree of religiosity as 
reference group. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Consistent with previous results, the parametric estimator also suggests a small impact of 
religious festivals and religiosity on positional concerns. We find significant differences 
only for the case of income. More exactly, we find that the subjects with a low degree of 
religiosity surveyed during Ramadan show significantly lower positional concerns 
compared to subjects with a low degree of positionality outside Ramadan. Other than 
that, none of the pairwise comparison of the estimated parameters of interaction terms 
differ significantly. The marginal degree of positionality can also be estimated using the 
linear predictions after the estimation of the interval regressions, conditional on the socio-
demographic variables. Our calculations show that the results produced by the interval 
regression are almost identical to the results presented above with the Spearman-Karber 
estimator, with the only difference being that the confidence intervals obtained with the 





The emerging literature on empirical tests of positionality confirms that positionality 
exists, but that the degree of positionality varies across goods and locations. However, 
differences within a location and the effect of socio-demographic circumstances and 
social environment remain poorly investigated, partly because students have been used. A 
notable exception is Carlsson et al. (2007), who used a random sample of Swedes. The 
present paper aimed to test whether there is an effect of religious festivals and degree of 
religiosity on the positional concerns of individuals using two experimental sessions 
conducted during and outside the Ramadan month respectively. We analyzed 
                                                 
13 The results are available upon request.    14
positionality for three goods: income, working hours (or leisure time), and car 
consumption.  
 
The results suggest that the subjects showed a substantial degree of positionality for each 
good, and as expected the lowest degree for working hours. Overall, the findings are 
similar to those in previous studies. Nonparametric and parametric analyses indicated, 
along the same lines, little statistical evidence of an effect of the analyzed religious 
festivals and religiosity on the degree of positionality although there are differences in 
magnitude. As expected according to religious doctrines, the positionality was lower 
during Ramadan. Moreover, the results suggest that people with a high degree of 
religiosity were unaffected by religious festivals, while people with a low degree of 
religiosity had a lower degree of positionality during the religious festival. This is 
expected since people with a high degree of religiosity are supposed to follow religious 
doctrine not only during Ramadan, but also during the rest of the year. Hence, there is no 
effect of the studied religious festival on the positional concerns of people who are highly 
religious. Given that envy is discussed in many places in the Quran, and that it should be 
evaded in order to be a good Muslim, it does not come as a surprise that less religious 
individuals are affected by a religious festival. 
 
In a broader perspective, there are interesting welfare implications of our findings, since 
the welfare loss of redistribution of resources during Ramadan is smaller than outside 
Ramadan. This is, as discussed above, explained by changed behavior among less 
religious people. Given the importance of festivals found in this paper, it would be 
interesting to find out the applicability to other festivals and activities that may induce 
changes in people’s attitudes toward others by, e.g., inducing empathy. For example, 
larger aid festivals (e.g., Live Aid in 1985) and charitable fundraisers for victims of 
natural disasters such as the Tsunami in Thailand in 2004 are successful in raising 
money, and this can at least partly be explained by changes in positional concerns. Thus, 
an important area for future research is to try to understand in which situations the 
welfare loss in case of redistribution is lower, or alternatively when to impose taxation on 
people to reduce the welfare losses for contributors.     15
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Appendix: Instructions in the survey experiment.  
 
            About your future relative… 
Example: 
 
In the example below, your future relative earns 200 TYR more in society A compared to in society B. You 
can also see that your future relative earns 500 TYR/month less than the average income in society A and 
300 TYR/month more than the average income in society B. 
 
                     Society A         –  Your relative’s income is 2,000 TYR/month after tax. 
                                             −  The average income in society is 2,500 TYR/month after tax. 
 
                     Society B         – Your relative’s income is 1,800 TYR/month after tax. 
                                             − The average income in society is 1,500 TYR/month after tax. 
 
Please choose which society you consider to be the best one for your future relative, that is, the society in 
which your future relative will be most content. It is important that you focus your answer solely on this. 
That is, which society is the best for your future relative? You should not consider which society is best 
overall. 
 
   Income Experiment 
 
Question 1                    Income for your future relative (1) 
Choose between society A and B for your future relative.  
  
          Society A                • Your relative’s income is 2,000 TYR/month after tax. 
                                          • The average income in society is 2,200 TYR/month after tax. 
  
          Society B   • Your relative’s income is 1,750 TYR/month after tax.  
  • The average income in society is 1,290 TYR/month after tax.  
Everything else is the same in the two societies, including the price level. In both society A and B, your 
relative works 40 hours per week, which is same as the average number of working hours. Choose the 
society that you consider to be the best for your future relative.  
                                                       ❐ Society A  
                                                       ❐ Society B  
 
Question 2                    Income for your future relative (2) 
Choose between society A and B for your future relative.  
  
          Society A               • Your relative’s income is 2,000 TYR/month after tax. 
                                         • The average income in society is 2,200 TYR/month after tax. 
  
         Society B   • Your relative’s income is 1,500 TYR/month after tax.  
  • The average income in society is 1,237 TYR/month after tax.    19
Everything else is the same in the two societies, including the price level. In both society A and B, your 
relative works 40 hours per week, which is same as the average number of working hours. Choose the 
society that you consider to be the best for your future relative.  
❐ Society A 
❐ Society B 
 
Question  3                  Income for your future relative (3) 
Choose between society A and B for your future relative.  
  
          Society A                 • Your relative’s income is 2,000 TYR/month after tax. 
                                          • The average income in society is 2,200 TYR/month after tax. 
  
         Society B   • Your relative’s income is 1,260 TYR/month after tax.  
  • The average income in society is 1,188 TYR/month after tax.  
Everything else is the same in the two societies, including the price level. In both society A and B, your 
relative works 40 hours per week, which is same as the average number of working hours. Choose the 
society that you consider to be the best for your future relative.  
❐ Society A 
❐ Society B 
 
Working hours experiment 
  
Question 4   Working hours and leisure for your future relative  
Choose between society A and B for your future relative. The societies are the same except for the 




       Society A                   • Your relative’s working hours are 40 hours per week.  
                                          • Average working hours are 36 hours per week.  
       Society B   • Your relative’s working hours are 42.5 hours per week.  
  • Average working hours are 46 hours per week.  
Everything else is the same in the two societies, including the price level. In both society A and B, your 
relative’s monthly income is 2,000 TYR, which is the same as the average income. Choose the society that 
you consider to be the best for your future relative.  
❐ Society A 
❐ Society B 
    20
Question 5   Working hours and leisure for your future relative  
Choose between society A and B for your future relative. The societies are the same except for the 
information given below. 
 
 
       Society A                   • Your relative’s working hours are 40 hours per week. 
                                          • Average working hours are 36 hours per week.  
       Society B   • Your relative’s working hours are 47 hours per week.  
  • Average working hours are 51 hours per week.  
Everything else is the same in the two societies, including the price level. In both society A and B your 
relative’s monthly income is 2,000 TYR, which is the same as the average income. Choose the society that 
you consider to be the best for your future relative.  
❐ Society A 
❐ Society B 
  
Question6   Working hours and leisure for your future relative  
Choose between society A and B for your future relative. The societies are the same except for the 
information given below.  
 
       Society A                   • Your relative’s working hours are 40 hours per week. 
                                          • Average working hours are 36 hours per week. 
    
       Society B   • Your relative’s working hours are 61 hours per week.  
  • Average working hours are 64 hours per week.  
Everything else is the same in the two societies, including the price level. In both society A and B your 
relative’s monthly income is 2,000 TYR, which is the same as the average income. Choose the society that 
you consider to be the best for your future relative.  
❐ Society A 
❐ Society B 
 
Car consumption experiment  
  
Question 7   Market value of the car for your future relative  
Choose between society A and B for your future relative. The societies are the same except for the 
information given below. This means the consumption of all other goods is the same in both societies even 
if the market value of cars is higher in one society. The company at which your relative works provides a 
company car.  
 
  • Your relative’s company car is a few years old with a market value of 
        Society A    30,000 TYR.  
  • The average market value of cars in the society is 33,000 TYR  
    21
           • Your relative’s company car is a few years old with a market value of  
        Society B    28,000 TYR  
  • The average market value of cars in the society is 25,036 TYR  
Everything else is the same in the two societies, including the price level and your relative’s income. 
Choose the society that you consider the best for your future relative. 
 
❐ Society A 
❐ Society B 
 
Question 8   Market value of the car for your future relative  
Choose between society A and B for your future relative. The societies are the same except for the 
information given below. This means the consumption of all other goods is the same in both societies even 
if the market value of cars is higher in one society. The company at which your relative works provides a 
company car.  
 
  • Your relative’s company car is a few years old with a market value of 
       Society A    30,000 TYR.  
  • The average market value of cars in the society is 33,000 TYR  
  
       Society B   • Your relative’s company car is a few years old with a market value of  
    25,000 TYR  
  • The average market value of cars in the society is 22,904 TYR  
Everything else is the same in the two societies, including the price level and your relative’s income. 
Choose the society that you consider the best for your future relative. 
 
❐ Society A 
❐ Society B 
  
Question 9   Market value of the car for your future relative  
Choose between society A and B for your future relative. The societies are the same except for the 
information given below. This means the consumption of all other goods is the same in both societies even 
if the market value of cars is higher in one society. The company at which your relative works provides a 
company car.  
  • Your relative’s company car is a few years old with a market value of 
        Society A    30,000 TYR.  
  • The average market value of cars in the society is 33,000 TYR  
  
        Society B   • Your relative’s company car is a few years old with a market value of  
    22,000 TYR  
  • The average market value of cars in the society is 21,829 TYR  
Everything else is the same in the two societies, including the price level and your relative’s income. 
Choose the society that you consider the best for your future relative. 
❐ Society A 
❐ Society B 
   22











Income experiment: TRY/Month 
                   Society A    2,000 2,200   
Question 1: Society B (1)    1,750 1,290  0.28 
Question 2: Society B (2)    1,500 1,237  0.52 
Question 3: Society B (3)    1,260 1,188  0.73 
Leisure experiment, working hours/week 
                   Society A    40 36   
Question 4: Society B (1)    42.5 46  0.25 
Question 5: Society B (2)    47 51 0.50 
Question 6: Society B (3)    61 64 0.75 
Car consumption experiment, market value in TRY 
                   Society A    30,000 33,000   
Question 7: Society B (1)    28,000 25,036  0.25 
Question 8: Society B (2)    25,000 22,904  0.50 
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Table 2. Descriptive results and tests of hypotheses by religious festival, religiosity and goods   
       Proportion of individuals choosing B  Pairwise Comparisons 
    
    
Implicit 
marginal degree 




Experiment  (p-values) 
Degree of Religiosity  Degree of Religiosity 
























Income experiment: TRY/Month                     
    N=34 N=35  N=69  N=36 N=25  N=61          
Society A                       
Question 1: Society B (1) (0.28)    0.44 0.51  0.48  0.61 0.56  0.59    0.15 0.73  0.20  0.20  0.53 
Question 2: Society B (2) (0.52)    0.43 0.43  0.43  0.61 0.56  0.59  0.15 0.32  0.08  0.34  0.53 
Question 3: Society B (3) (0.73)    0.35 0.37  0.36  0.55 0.52  0.54  0.09 0.26  0.04  0.29  0.60 
Estimated mean marginal degree of positionality - (Spearman-Karber estimator)                
    0.40 0.50  0.44  0.58 0.52  0.55         
95% confidence intervals    [0.29-0.51] [0.39-0.61]  [0.36-0.52] [0.49-0.67]  [0.40-0.65] [0.48-0.63]           
Leisure experiment, working hours/week                       
    N=30 N=36  N=66  N=43 N=31  N=74           
Society A                         
Question 4: Society B (1) (0.25)    0.47 0.50  0.48  0.63 0.68  0.65  0.18 0.15  0.05  0.78  0.79 
Question 5: Society B (2) (0.50)    0.27 0.36  0.32  0.47 0.61  0.53  0.09 0.04  0.01  0.81  0.30 
Question 6: Society B (3) (0.75)    0.20 0.19  0.19  0.35 0.35  0.35  0.17 0.14  0.04  0.58  0.79 
Estimated mean marginal degree of positionality - (Spearman-Karber estimator)              
















95% confidence intervals    [0.27-0.53] [0.22-0.53]  [0.29-0.48] [0.38-0.60]  [0.37-0.65] [0.41-0.58]           
Car consumption experiment, market value in TRY                   
    N=33 N=34  N=67  N=42 N=24  N=66           
Society A                         
Question 7: Society B (1) (0.25)    0.61 0.65  0.63  0.67 0.58  0.64  0.59 0.63  0.91  0.67  0.38 
Question 8: Society B (2) (0.50)    0.46  0.56 0.51  0.62  0.46  0.56  0.16 0.46  0.54  0.26  0.14 
Question 9: Society B (3) (0.75)     0.42  0.32 0.37  0.48  0.46  0.47  0.66 0.30  0.26  0.93  0.68 
Estimated mean marginal degree of positionality - (Spearman-Karber estimator) 
   0.48  0.52  0.50  0.56  0.46  0.53           
95% confidence intervals   [0.36-0.59]  [0.39-0.65]  [0.41-0.58] [0.46-0.66]  [0.30-0.63] [0.44-0.61]           
Note: The p-value is the probability value obtained from Mann-Whitney U test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test). N is the number of observations. Low means a low degree of religiosity 
and high means a high degree of religiosity.   25
 
Table 3. Estimation results: Interval regressions                   
Goods 









Religious ritual and religiosity interactions          
          
Ramadan (=1)*Low degree of religisity (=1)  -0.146 *  -0.065   -0.079  
  (0.086)   (0.073)   (0.079)   
Ramadan (=1)*High degree of religisity (=1)  -0.028   -0.056   -0.063   
  (0.094)   (0.077)   (0.083)   
Non-Ramadan (=1)*High degree of religisity (=1)  -0.055   0.051   -0.119  
  (0.094)   (0.076)   (0.089)   
Socio-economic variables          
           
Age/100  -0.701   -1.088 **  1.044  
  (0.500)   (0.496)   (0.551)   
Gender (Male=1)  -0.054   -0.034   -0.023   
  (0.072)   (0.059)   (0.059)   
Living with parents in the same house (=1)  -0.005   0.088 *  0.007  
  (0.065)   (0.053)   (0.062)   
Log(household size)  0.016   -0.016   0.114  
  (0.096)   (0.088)   (0.092)   
Subjective perception of relative income position of the subject          
          
                        Average  0.018   -0.008   0.050  
  (0.086)   (0.075)   (0.086)   
                        above average   0.160   -0.137 *  0.131  
  (0.103)   (0.082)   (0.102)   
          
Constant  0.546 **  0.701 ***  0.160  
  (0.220)   (0.194)   (0.216)   
Sigma  0.336 ***  0.292 ***  0.321 *** 
  (0.010)   (0.011)   (0.009)   
Log of pseudo likelihood  -226.077     -224.746     -225.305    
#Observations  (N)  130   140   133   
                    
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance level at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels.  
 